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June 1967]

ESTATE OF TAYLOR
[66 C.2d 855; 59 Cal.Rptr. 437, 428 P.2d 3011

[L. A. No. 29051.

In Bank.

855

June 16, 1967.]

Estate of EVA BARCLAY TAYLOR, Deceased. HAROLD
JAMES DUERDEN, Individually and as Executor, etc.,
et al., Petitioners and Appellants, v. GENEVIEVE C.
COONEY, Individually and as Administratrix Vlith the
Will Annexed, etc., Objector and Appellant; ROSEMARY LICK, Objector and Respondent.
[1] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-Trial, Evidence.-The trial
court's finding that the executor's overall delay in settling a
testator's estate was unreasonable, and that the estate should
have been distributed before the death, on March 15, 1965, of
a beneficiary to whom one-third of the residue was to go if she
survived distribution, was supported by evidence that letters
testamentary were issued in December 1963, that the executor
was an alternate beneficiary if she failed so to survive, and
that his belated- and unnecessary decision to sell securities
delayed the petition for final distribution until March 4, 1965,
despite his knowledge that she was ill, without funds and
had asked him to expedite distribution, and despite the facts
that the estate had the cash to pay inheritance taxes and that
distribution could have been made in 1964.
.
[2a, 2b] Wills-Interest Passing-Time to Which Contingency Is
Referable-When Distribution Unreasonably Delayed: Death
of Taker Before Happening of Contingency.-In accordance
with Prob. Code, § 142, relating to testamentary conditions
precedent, and with the established policy favoring prompt
distribution of estates, and the absence of any indication of a
contrary intent by the testator, vesting of contingent interests
under a will cannot be postponed by unreasonable delay in
preparing the estate for distribution, and such interests vest
at the time distribution should have been made, cutting off not
only any alternate interest the executor may have had in such
property but also that of any other alternate beneficiary.
[8] Decedents' Estates-Distribution-Preliminary DistributionEffect of Failure to Seek: Wills-Interest Passing-Contingent Gift.-A beneficiary, to whom one-third of the residue of
a will was to go if she survived distribution, was under no
obligation to petition for a preliminary distribution, and her

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Wills, § 337 et seq; Am. Jur. , Wills (1st ed
§ 1251 et seq).
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Estates, § 988; [2] Wills,
§§ 383, 384; [3] Decedents' Estates, § 994; Wills, § 380; [4, 5]
Decedents' Estates, § 225; [6] Decedents' Estates, § 217.
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failure to do so, before she died just prior to the hearing of
the petition for final distribution, did not and could not constitute a forfeiture of her interest, where such interest had
already vested by virtue of the executor's unreasonable delay
in the distribution of the estate.
[4a, 4b] Id.-Executors-Extra Compensation.-In the administration of a decedent's estate, the trial court, at the contested
hearing of the petition for final distribution, did not err in
awarding extraordinary fees of $1,000 to the executor and
$1,000 to his attorneys, where it was undisputed that they had
performed extraordinary services as defined in Probe Code,
§ 902, and where the record showed no abuse of discretion in
fixing the fees.

[6] Id. - Executors - Extra Compensation. - Compensation for
extraordinary services awarded to executors of wills and their
attorneys must be upheld on appeal unless they so clearly
appear to be out of proportion to the value of the services
performed as to establish an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.

[6] Id.-Compensation of Executors-Forfeiture.-Delay in settling an estate is not a ground for denying executors' and
administrators' fees otherwise justified by the services
rendered.

APPEALS from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County distributing a portion of the residue of an
estate and allowing extraordinary fees to the executor and his
attorneys. Arthur K~ Marshall, Judge. Affirmed.
K. S. Burns for Petitioners and Appellants.
Norman Elliott as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners
and Appellants.
Richard A. Perkins for Objector and Appellant and for Objector and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J. - Eva Barclay Taylor died testate
September 14, 1963. Her will provided that one-third of the
residue of her estate should go to Ellen Catherine Glasky if
she survived distribution of the estate. If she predeceased
. distribution, her one-third share was to go in equal shares to
[4] See Cal.Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 889; Am.
Jur.2d, Executors and Administrators, § 529.
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Harold James Duerden and William Henry Duerden, J r.1
The will was admitted to probate on November 26, 1963, and
letters testamentary were issued to Harold, the executor of the
estate, on December 2, 1963. The petition for final distribution
was filed March 4, 1965, requesting that one-third of the residue of the estate be distributed to Ellen. Hearing on the
petition was set for March 29, 1965. Ellen died March 15,
1965. Harold then filed another petition for final distribution
requesting that the one-third share bequeathed to Ellen be
distributed to him and William. Objections to the petition
were filed by Genevieve C. Cooney, administratrix with the
will annexed of Ellen's estate and a legatee under Ellen's
will, and by Rosemary Lick, also a legatee under Ellen's will.
The court sustained the objections to the petition for final
distribution and decreed that Ellen's interest vested in her
before her death. The court found that the estate could have
been distributed in September of 1964 and should have been
distributed before the death of Ellen in March of. 1965. It
ordered distribution of Ellen's share to Miss Cooney as
administratrix of Ellen's estate. It also awarded extraordinary fees to the executor and attorney for the estate. Harold
and William Duerden appeal from the part of the order
distributing Ellen's share to Miss Cooney. Miss Cooney
appeals from the part of the order awarding extraordinary
fees.
[1] The evidence supports the findings of the trial court.
There was evidence that the executor, Harold, knew that
Ellen was ill and without funds; that she requested him to
expedite proceedings concerning distribution of the estate;
that inheritance taxes could have been approximately computed; that there was sufficient cash in the estate to pay any
such taxes; and that it was therefore unnecessary to sell many
of the securities that were sold. The sales that were made,
whether necessary or not, could reasonably have been made at
an earlier date, and Harold's attorney testified that many of
the securities in the estate could have been distributed without being sold, but that she "didn't think of" this possibility. But for the belated decision to sell securities in the fall
of 1964, the estate could easily have been distributed in that
IThe will provides: "In the event the said Ellen Catherine Glasky predeceases me, or predeceases the distribution of my estate, the share of
my estate which she would have taken by this Article of my Will but for
her death, shall go and be given in equal shares to HAROLD JAKES
Dt1DDEN and WILLIAK HENRY DUERDJI:N, JR. ••• "
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year. The trial court was therefore justified in concluding
that the overall delay was unreasonable and in finding that
the estate should have been distributed before Ellen's
death.
[23] Based on this finding, the court applied the rule that
vesting cannot be postponed by unreasonable delay in preparing an estate for distribution and that when there is such
delay contingent interests vest at the time distribution should
have been made. (See 5 Page, Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision
1962) § 43.11, p. 367.) We have found no case that considers
whether this rule is applicable in this state. The Duerdens
contend that the rule is inconsistent with Probate Code section 142. That section provides: "A condition precedent in a
will is one which is required to be fulfilled before a particular
disposition takes effect. It is to be deemed performed when the
testator's intention has been substantially, though not literally, complied with. Nothing vests until such condition is ful.
filled, except where fulfillment is impossible. . . ." ThE
crucial issue under this section is whether a clause requiring
survivorship should be interpreted to mean survivorship tc
distribution or survivorship to the time distribution shoulc
have occurred, or, as an alternative, whether survivor~hip t(
the· e~rlier date constitutes substantial compliance with th.
condition. Under either interpretation we believe that unrea
son able delay cannot defeat the beneficiary's interest. Thi
conclusion promotes the established policy favoring promp
distribution of estates (see Estate of Hagemann, 63 Ca1.2.
131, 136 [45 Cal.Rptr. 149, 403 P.2d 405] ; Estate of Toler, 4
Cal.2d 460, 467, 469 [319 P.2d 337]) and carries out the prE
surned intent of the testatrix. In the absence of any indicatio
to the contrary a testator contemplates prompt distributiOl
His intention is substantially complied with if a beneficiar
who is alive at the time distribution could and should ha~
occurred is allowed to take under the will. 2 (See Civ. Cod
§ 3529.)
2'fhe same policy reasons that lead us to conclude that the gift to Ell
cannot be defeated by unreasonable delay in distribution compel t
conclusion that Probate Code section 1023 does not make void the orG
distributing Ellen's gift to the administratrix of her estate. The seco
paragraph of that section provides that: "In the event any heir, devit
or legatee so dying before distribution is named in any decree of d
tribution heretofore or hereafter entered, purporting to make distril
tion to such distributee by name, Much decree shall not be deemed Vt
but shall have the same effect all though such distribution had been mf .
to him while living. However, where the share is purportedly distribu·
to him pursuant to the terms of a will which provides that he shall
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Our conclusion is in accord with the rule followed in
England (see, e.g, Brooke v. Lewis (V.C. 1822) 6 Madd.Ch.
358, 56 Eng.Rep. 1128; In re lVilkins (1881) hR. 18 eh.Div.
634; Re Arrowsmith (1860) 29 L.J.Ch. 774, 778; Note, 142
A.L.R. 136, 148-150) and in other states (see, e.g., Forman Y.
Brent, 309 Ky. 735, 739 [218 S.vV.2d 655] ; Will of Greene,
240 Wis. 452, 463-464 [3 N.W.2d 704, 142 A.L.R. 129] ; Biles
v. Webb, 118 Ohio St. 346, 355-357 [161 N.E. 49]). In re
Estate of Jennrich, 197 Minn. 162 [266 N.W. 461, 267 N.\V.
143], is not to the contrary, for in sustaining the gift to the
alternative beneficiary the court explicitly noted that there
was no evidence of dilatory administration by the executor
and "nothing in the record indicating that the delay was not
entirely in accordance with her [a beneficiary who died before
distribution] desires." (In re Estate of J ennrich, supra, 197
Minn. at p. 168.)
[3] The Duerdens contend that since Ellen could have
petitioned for a preliminary distribution during her life,
delay in settling the estate cannot vest title in her. Ellen was
under no obligation to petition for preliminary distribution,
and there is "no principle which would create a forfeiture
because of failure to take such legal action." (Forman v.
Brent, supra, 309 Ky. at p. 739.)
[2b] The Duerdens assert that even if the executor,
Harold, should not take because of the delay, William should
take one-half of Ellen's bequest. This contention is based on
the erroneous assumption that the rule vesting Ellen's interest is designed solely to prevent an executor from profiting by
his own wrong. Ellen's conditional bequest vested at a time
before her death, not because of the executor's wrong, but
because that was the time when distribution should have
occurred.
We find no merit in the contention that our holding will
lea.d to undesirable uncertainty in the settlement of estates.
entitled to the same only in the event he survives the date of distribution,
then such purported distribution as to him shall be void. This paragraph
shall not apply in any ease where such heir, devisee or legatee dies before
the decedent." This provision operates to render void distribution to a
deceased person only when the gift to him fails because of his death prior
to distribution. (See the history of section 1023 in Cont. Ed. Bar,
Review of Selected 1955 Code Legislation 169, disclosing the procedural
nature of the section.) In the present case, since distribution was unreasonably delayed, the gift to Ellen did not fail; for the same reason
E8tate 01 Jameson, 93 Ca1.App.2d 35, 38-40 [208 P.2d 54]; Estate of
Hampe, 85 Cal.App.2d 557, 558 [193 P.2d 133]; and Estate 01 Clarke,
103 Cal.App. 243, 246 [284 P. 231], are inapplicable.
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By its very nature a clause requiring survivorship to distribution creates uncertainty as to who will take until distribution
is effected. Little or no detrimental uncertainty is added by
requiring a determination as to when the estate should have
been settled in cases that may arise in which a beneficiary dies
during extended probate proceedings.
[4&] On her cross-appeal Miss Cooney contends that the
trial court erred in awarding $1,000 to Harold as executor and
$1,000 to his attorneys as extraordinary fees. s [5] These
awards must be upheld unless they so clearly appear to be
out of proportion to the value of the services performed 88
to establish. an abuse of discretion by the trial court. (See,
e.g., Estate 01 Windiate, 197 Cal.App.2d 560, 566 [17 Cal.
Rptr. 297].) [6] Moreover, delay in settling the estate is
not a ground for denying fees otherwise justified by the
services ,rendered. (Cf. Estate 01 Roberts, 27 Cal.2d 70, 76
[162 P.2d 461],) [4b] It is undisputed that the executor
and his attorney performed extraordinary services as defined
in Probate Code section 902, and the record does not establish
any abuse of discretion in fixing the fees for such service.
The order is affirmed. Each party shall bear ,its own costs on
appeal.
:
I

Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J., and Sullivan,
J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I dissent and would reverse the order insofar as it decreed that Ellen'8 interest vested before her death
and ordered distribution to the administratrix of her estate.
Where a will provides that the interest of a beneficiary is
contingent upon his surviving distribution, survivorship is a
condition precedent to vesting and the beneficiary's interest
fails if he dies prior to the making of an order of distribution.
(Estate 01 Jameson, 93 Cal.App.2d 35, 38-40 [1] [208 P.2d
54] [hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; Estate 01
Hampe, 85 Cal.App.2d 557, 558 [1] [193 P.2d 133] [hearing
denied by the Supreme Court].)
Section 142 of the Probate Code provides: "A condition
precedent in a will is one which is required to be fulfilled
. before partiCUlar disposition takes effect. It is to be deemed
performed when the testator's intention has been substantially, though not literally, complied with. Nothing vests until
lIn addition, each received statutory commissions of t1,848.47.

such condition is fulfilled, except where fulfillment is impossible . . . . " (Italics added.)
In the instant case, fulfillment of the condition was not
impossible. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute,
vesting had not occurred.
The petition of the petitioners and appellants for a rehearing was denied July 12, 1967, and the opinion was modified to
read as printed above.

